A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Adversarial Classification by Dritsoula, Lemonia et al.
1A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Adversarial
Classification
Lemonia Dritsoula, Patrick Loiseau, and John Musacchio
Abstract—Attack detection is usually approached as a clas-
sification problem. However, standard classification tools often
perform poorly because an adaptive attacker can shape his
attacks in response to the algorithm. This has led to the recent
interest in developing methods for adversarial classification, but
to the best of our knowledge, there have been very few prior
studies that take into account the attacker’s tradeoff between
adapting to the classifier being used against him with his desire
to maintain the efficacy of his attack. Including this effect is key
to derive solutions that perform well in practice.
In this investigation we model the interaction as a game
between a defender who chooses a classifier to distinguish
between attacks and normal behavior based on a set of observed
features and an attacker who chooses his attack features (class 1
data). Normal behavior (class 0 data) is random and exogenous.
The attacker’s objective balances the benefit from attacks and the
cost of being detected while the defender’s objective balances the
benefit of a correct attack detection and the cost of false alarm.
We provide an efficient algorithm to compute all Nash equilibria
and a compact characterization of the possible forms of a Nash
equilibrium that reveals intuitive messages on how to perform
classification in the presence of an attacker. We also explore
qualitatively and quantitatively the impact of the non-attacker
and underlying parameters on the equilibrium strategies.
Index Terms—adversarial classification, game theory, security,
Nash equilibrium, threshold strategies, randomization
I. INTRODUCTION
Classification is one of the most used tools from machine
learning. In its simplest instance, a classification algorithm
trains a model from a set of labeled data samples of two
different classes (class 0 and class 1) and then uses this model
to predict the class of new data samples. Many classification
algorithms (Support Vector Machines, Logistic Regression,
Naive Bayes, etc.) were developed over the past decades and
successfully used in applications ranging from computer vision
to biology or marketing [4], [46], [52].
One of the most prominent applications of classification
is security [55], where a defender typically aims to classify
a system’s usage into normal/non-attack (class 0) or mali-
cious/attack (class 1). In this framework, attacks can range
from spams received at a user’s inbox (class 1) that must be
distinguished from regular emails (class 0) to more serious
attacks such as DoS or malicious infiltrations on a server (class
1) that must be distinguished from benign traffic (class 0).
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Although standard classification algorithms have been used
to perform such tasks relatively successfully for some time,
recent experimental studies showed that a smart adaptive
attacker can easily shape his attacks to render those algorithms
inefficient [39], [48], [53], [57]. This leads to the crucial
question of how to perform adversarial classification, that
is classification in a setting where (part of) the data is not
i.i.d. but rather generated by an adversary trying to fool the
classifier.
In the last decade, a significant body of work from the ma-
chine learning and security communities appeared on adversar-
ial classification (see Section I-A). The literature defines two
types of attacks: poisoning and evasion attacks. In poisoning
attacks, the attacker can alter the training set. The adversarial
classification literature mainly analyzes the vulnerability of
standard algorithms in this case and sometimes proposes
more robust algorithms. Most of these solutions, however,
are either too simplistic in that they do not account for the
attacker’s adaptive nature, or too pessimistic because they
rely on the worst-case (zero-sum) assumption that the attacker
and defender have opposite objectives; leading to sub-optimal
performance in both cases. In evasion attacks, the classifier
is fixed and the attacker simply attempts to reverse-engineer
it to find an attack that suits his goal while being classified
in class 0. Interestingly, there, the literature recently proposed
to use randomized classifiers as a defense; but without any
formalism to justify the need for randomization and to opti-
mize the distribution of classifiers used for defense. Overall,
the problem of finding a classifier that works optimally against
an adaptive attacker with a realistic (nonzero-sum) objective
remains open.
In parallel, a set of works appeared on applying game theory
to security scenarios in order to compute optimal defenses
against an adaptive adversary, in particular in the contexts
of intrusion detection [2] and defense resource allocation
[51] (see Section I-A). In most games studied there, there
exists a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, which
justifies randomization and provides a framework to compute
the defense distribution. However, none of these works studied
a game with a payoff that captures the full complexity of the
adversarial classification problem.
In this paper, we use a game-theoretic approach to tackle
the question of how to perform classification in an adversarial
setting where an adaptive attacker whose objective is not
opposite to the defender’s generates the data of class 1.
Specifically, we propose to model the system as a game
between an attacker and a defender, where the attacker chooses
his attack patterns (corresponding to class 1 data) and the
defender chooses a classification strategy. In our game, normal
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2usage (class 0 data) is random and exogenous. The attacker’s
objective balances the benefit from attacks and the cost of
being detected while the defender’s objective balances the
benefit of a correct attack detection and the cost of false
alarm. Then, we give a complete analysis of the game’s
Nash equilibria that provides both an algorithm to compute
all Nash equilibria and a characterization of the possible
forms of a Nash equilibrium. Our characterization is very
compact and reveals several important and intuitive messages
on classification in the presence of an attacker.
i) First, we find that the defender must randomize the
classification rule.
ii) Second, the defender should mix between classifiers only
from a small subset of simple classifiers that correspond
to applying a threshold on the attacker’s benefit from the
attack. If the attack pattern is a multi-dimensional quan-
tity (i.e., the classification is based on several features),
this is in contrast with known algorithms such as logistic
regression which have a predefined shape of the boundary
independently of the attacker’s goal. We also find that
the weight assigned to each threshold classifier is mainly
proportional to the marginal reward increase at that point.
iii) Third, the attacker should essentially mimic the distribu-
tion of the normal behavior but only on a subset of the
support with patterns that yield the highest payoff.
iv) Finally, our results allow us to analyze the investment
tradeoffs that a strategic defender is facing when she
needs to decide whether or not to acquire more data about
the attacker (e.g., investing in a new sensor).
We provide numerical experiments that exemplify these results
and their applications. Overall, our results provide a first step
towards building classification algorithms that work well in
general adversarial settings.
A. Related Work
a) Adversarial classification: The problem of adversarial
classification has inspired a lot of research from the machine
learning and security communities (see surveys in [7], [24]).
In a seminal paper, Dalvi et al. [17] tackle the problem
of classifying a malicious intruder in the presence of an
innocent user using a setting close to ours where the malicious
intruder can perturb his behavior to confuse the classifier.
However, they compute only the best response, which means
that each player can adapt only once. Instead, we consider
a fully adaptive attacker and defender and compute the Nash
equilibrium. A number of papers (Globerson and Roweis [23],
Zhou et al. [58], [59]) study a similar type of attacks and
attempt to propose robust classifiers but always using a worst-
case assumption which is overly pessimistic in practice.
To the best of our knowledge, the only works that analyze
adversarial classification using nonzero-sum games are the
studies by Bru¨ckner et al. [11]–[13], and the studies by Lisy´
et al. [29] and Samusevich [45]. The setting of Bru¨ckner et al.
[11]–[13], however, is quite different from ours. They restrict
the classifier to particular forms (e.g., logistic regression,
where the defender’s choice is the set of weights) and identify
conditions under which a unique pure Nash equilibrium exists.
In contrast, we do not restrict the classifiers a priori and we
derive the set of classifiers used at equilibrium (which, as we
show, depends on the attacker’s utility and can therefore not
be fixed without considering this); and we focus on mixed
strategy Nash equilibria which are the only ones that make
sense in most instances of our model. The setting of Lisy´ et
al. [29] is closer to ours. They assume that the attacker and the
defender both choose a threshold in [0, 1] and that the attacker
is detected if his chosen threshold is higher than the defender’s.
Using nonzero-sum payoffs, they give several properties of
the Nash equilibrium (in mixed strategies) and propose a
method based on discretization to compute an approximate
equilibrium. Samusevich [45] derives extensions based on
the same model, notably to take into account multiple types
of attackers and bounded rationality. This model, however,
abstracts away the complexity of multi-feature classification
by assuming that players choose a threshold and that the clas-
sification result is computed through a ROC curve. In contrast,
our model starts with all possible classifiers in the multi-
feature case and shows that well-defined threshold classifiers
are sufficient. Also, using a discrete model, we propose an
efficient procedure to compute the exact Nash equilibrium.
All the aforementioned papers study poisoning attacks
where the attacker can alter the training set. The study of
evasion attacks was pioneered by Lowd and Meek [31] in
the case of linear classifiers and extended by Nelson et
al. [40] for convex-inducing classifiers. A recent study by
Vorobeychik and Li [28], [56] recognizes the inefficiency of
deterministic classifiers in this context. The authors compare
the efficiency between two classifiers and investigate under
which assumptions it is better to deterministically select a
single classifier or uniformly randomize between them. In
this paper, we formally justify the need for randomization
using game theory and we consider a more general form of
interaction (nonzero-sum game). We also start by considering
an exhaustive set of all possible classifiers and analytically
derive the subset of classifiers that the defender uses (threshold
classifiers on the attacker’s reward) and the distribution on this
subset.
Some forms of thresholds are implemented ad hoc in most
spam filtering algorithms to balance false alarm costs and
detection gains, using standard deterministic classifiers. Our
work provides a formal framework that takes into account
the existence of strategic attackers willing to change how
they attack to evade detection. Then, randomized classifiers
are derived as an optimal and stable solution; no player
has an economic benefit to unilaterally deviate. Our analysis
shows that the defender should use threshold classifiers on
the attack reward, contrasting with known algorithms like
logistic regression which has a predefined shape of boundary
independent of the attacker’s goal.
In parallel to theoretical research aimed at proposing robust
classifiers, several empirical works have studied the vulner-
ability of standard machine learning algorithms to various
kinds of attacks [39], [48], [53], [57]. In particular, Sommer
and Paxson [48] identified reasons why machine learning
algorithms do not work well in practical adversarial settings
and found that the most common pitfall is that attackers adjust
3their activity in practice to avoid detection.
b) Game theory and intrusion detection: Researchers in
the “game theory for security” community have also tackled
the problem of detecting an attacker using game models, see
surveys in [2], [16], [33]–[35], [43].
Chen and Leneutre [14] address the intrusion detection
problem in heterogeneous networks consisting of nodes with
different non-correlated security assets. Our model is similar in
that different attack vectors can be thought of as distributions
over targets of different values. The authors of [14], however,
assume that the detection probability is the same for any
attack and defense strategies, yielding the utility function to
be the sum of the utilities on each target. On the contrary,
we involve different detection and false alarm rates, which
makes the set-up more realistic for adversarial classification,
but makes the analysis more challenging. We also assume
asymmetric information, since the defender is not aware of
whether she faces an attacker or a non-attacker. Other works
on game theory for intrusion detection (Alpcan and Bas¸ar [1],
Liu et al. [30]) have similar restrictive assumptions as [14]
that differentiate them from our work. Lye and Wing [34]
have also investigated a security problem with multiple targets.
They analyze a stochastic game between an attacker and
administrator and compute the best response strategies of the
players using a non-linear program, while we analyze the Nash
equilibria of a classification game, which is a stronger solution
concept.
The games mentioned above are nonzero-sum games. A
number of other nonzero-sum games have been discussed in
the literature under the term “security games”, see [27]; but
they share the restriction of [14] that the payoff is the sum of
the payoffs on each targets, which does not model the problem
of adversarial classification well. Let us finally mention that
many applications of nonzero-sum games consider Stackelberg
equilibria in which the defender chooses first its mixed action
[27], [51]. In our model, we consider a simultaneous move
game and find the Nash equilibria. We find that our nonzero-
sum game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game, and
thus we can analyze our nonzero-sum game using a zero-sum
game.
Barni and Tondi [5], [6] use a game-theoretic approach to
solve a problem of source identification. Their setting differs
from ours in that the attacker chooses a distribution of attacks
on top of which randomization is exogenously added, whereas
we suppose that the attacker directly chooses his attack vector
(using a mixed strategy). More importantly, they consider a
zero-sum game and derive an asymptotic Nash equilibrium
with numerical computations, while we focus on a nonzero-
sum game and derive closed-form expressions for the equilib-
ria. Stamm et al. [49] also use game theory to find optimal
defense strategies in the context of multimedia forensics. They
only derive best responses for the defender given a fixed
attack distribution though, and do not characterize the Nash
equilibria.
The classification game we investigate is similar in nature to
the inspection game, a multi-stage game between a customs in-
spector and a smuggler, proposed and studied by Dresher [18]
and Maschler [36]. Avenhaus et al. [3] find the equilibrium of
the general nonzero-sum game by using an auxiliary zero-sum
game in which the inspectee chooses a violation procedure and
the inspector chooses a statistical test with a given false alarm
probability. We do not separate the general nonzero-sum game
into two games but show the equivalence to a zero-sum game
and provide structure to the equilibrium strategies of a single-
shot simultaneous-move game.
A subset of our results appeared in earlier versions of
this paper [19], [20], in a simplified setting. Indeed, in [19],
[20] we consider that the attack is characterized by a scalar
quantity rather than a vector and impose the use of threshold
strategies for the defender. Instead, here, we allow more
flexibility by considering attack vectors of arbitrary dimension
and considering the set of all possible classifiers and we prove
that, at Nash equilibrium, the defender uses only threshold
strategies on the attacker’s reward (which is one of our main
result). We also extend [19], [20] by considering all possible
Nash equilibria and associated defender/attacker strategy form,
by identifying when the Nash equilibrium is unique, and
by showing numerically how our results can be applied to
analyzing the variations of the equilibrium strategies with the
model parameters and the trade-off in investing in a new sensor
to increase the features used for classification.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, the classification game we consider is presented. In
Section III we justify the selection of threshold strategies for
the defender and the proportionality of the attacker’s equilib-
rium strategy to the non-attacker’s distribution (Theorem 1).
Section IV provides a Nash equilibrium analysis that gives
insights on the structure of the players’ equilibrium strategies
(Theorem 2). Section V contains the simulation results, and
the paper concludes with remarks in Section VI. To improve
the flow of the paper, longer or more technical proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
Notational Conventions: Throughout the paper, we will use
the following notational conventions. All vectors are assumed
to be column vectors and are denoted by bold lowercase letters
(e.g., α, β). The inner product of two vectors α, β of size
n is denoted by α · β = ∑ni=1 αiβi. For matrices we use
capital greek letters (e.g., Λ). We denote matrix elements in
row i and column j by Λ(i, j). We use the prime sign (′) for
transpose of matrices and vectors. We use “minα” to denote
the minimum element of a vector α, and “minimize” when
we minimize a specific expression over some constraints. The
indicator function is denoted by 1cond; it is equal to 1 if “cond”
holds and is equal to 0 otherwise. The column vector of ones
of length N is denoted by 1N and the matrix of ones of
dimensions N×M is denoted by 1N×M . The norm of a vector
x of length N , denoted by ‖x‖, always refers to the L1-norm,
i.e, ‖x‖ = |x1|+ |x2|+ . . .+ |xN |, while the cardinality of a
set S is denoted by |S|. The probability given to strategy s is
denoted by αs.
II. THE CLASSIFICATION GAME
In this section, we present our game-theoretic model of
adversarial classification.
4We consider a strategic situation between a defender and
an agent that may either be an attacker with probability p or
a non-attacker with probability 1 − p. Throughout the paper,
we use the generic term non-attacker to designate a “normal
user” of the system at stake, that is a non-strategic user
without any particular adversarial objective (we will specify
later the behavior of a non-attacker). The defender seeks to
classify the agent as class 0 (non-attacker) or class 1 (attacker).
The strategic attacker seeks to exploit the uncertainty of the
defender (about the type of the agent) by attacking in such
a way as to avoid being classified as an attacker. This sce-
nario encompasses many applications. For instance, in spam
classification, the spammer (the attacker) might change the
frequency of words included in an email to evade spam filters.
In that case, the non-attacker is the sender of a regular email.
In another setting, the owner of fraudulent twitter accounts
(the attacker) might try to acquire more followers or publish
more posts, so that he will get misclassified as a normal user
(the non-attacker here) [50], [53].
Formally, the agent selects an attack vector v in V , where
V is the set of all possible attack vectors. The attack vector
contains all features used by the defender for classification;
e.g., average number of followers, number of retweets, and
others (in social networks fraud), number of initiated connec-
tions (in portscanner detection [25]), path on a graph among
nodes in a network or number of accesses to different targets
(in intrusion detection). Therefore, although we use the term
“attack vector,” our setting is not restricted to pure attack
scenarios but instead covers any setting in which a defender
needs to detect a malicious user, who seeks to evade detection
by gaming. The defender selects a classifier in C, where
C ⊆ 2|V| is the set of all possible classifiers. A classifier
corresponds to a classification rule that determines the class to
which the agent is assigned upon observing his attack vector:
Definition 1 (Classifier). A classifier c is a function c : V →
{0, 1}, with
c(v) =
{
1 for “attacker” classification,
0 for “non-attacker” classification.
We assume that V is finite, thus C is also a finite set.
If the agent is a non-attacker, he picks v ∈ V according to a
distribution PN(·) over V , known to both players. If the agent
is an attacker, the choice v is strategic: the attacker seeks to
maximize the payoff function
UA(v, c) = R(v)− cd1c(v)=1, (1)
where R : V → R+ is the reward function, and cd is the cost
in case of detection. We refer to R(v) as the “reward” (to
the attacker) for the attack vector v, which is granted to the
attacker even in case of detection. In contrast, his “payoff”
is the reward minus the cost if detected. One can view the
reward term as the immediate benefit from the attack, while the
detection cost can be interpreted as the attacker’s “opportunity
cost” from losing the opportunity to extract value in future
attacks after having been exposed. There are many real world
scenarios in which the reward is granted to the attacker even
upon detection. In most such scenarios, classification does
not occur real-time leaving some exploitation window for the
attacker. For instance, consider online app stores that contain
malware. By the time these apps are classified as malicious and
removed from the stores, the owners of the apps (attackers)
will already have benefited, e.g., from online purchases, from
compromising users’ information, paid ads, and others.
The defender’s payoff has two additive components. The
first is the expected loss to the attacker. When the attacker
is present, the loss to the defender is assumed to be minus
the gain of the attacker, −UA(v, c). Recall that the attacker’s
utility UA(v, c) is composed of a reward term R(v) minus a
detection cost term. Thus the defender is in a sense earning
a detection reward that matches the attacker’s detection cost.
This “reward” can be seen as the future costs the defender
avoids by detecting the attacker now. Since the defender
interacts with an attacker with chance p, the expected loss to
the attacker is −pUA(v, c). The second component captures
the expected loss due to false alarms. Since the non-attacker
is present with chance 1 − p, the expected false alarm cost
is 1− p times the chance that a non-attacker would pick a v
that gets classified as an attacker. Finally, the whole payoff
function is scaled by the constant 1/p for the convenience of
having the term UA(v, c) appear unscaled in the payoff. Note
that scaling a player’s payoff function by a constant has no
strategic effect on a game since the player retains the same
preferences among outcomes. The resulting payoff function is
UD(v, c) = −UA(v, c)− 1− p
p
cfa
∑
v′∈V
PN (v
′)1c(v′)=1, (2)
where cfa is a constant that captures the cost of false alarms.
Note that for simplicity of the exposition, we assume that
the defender has a cost R(v) (in the UA(v, c) term) upon
attack vector v, equal to the reward to the attacker. Our
results, however, can be straightforwardly extended to the
case where an attack vector v yields a cost to the defender
D(v) 6= R(v). Indeed, this would correspond to a payoff
UˆD(v, c) = UD(v, c) + R(v) − D(v) which has no strategic
effect since, for any v ∈ V , maximizing UˆD with respect to c
is equivalent to maximizing UD. Note though, that the payoff
of the defender will be changed.
To summarize our model, we define the following game.
Definition 2 (Classification game G). The classification game
G = (V, C, p, cd, cfa, PN, R(·)) is the two-player game between
the attacker and the defender, where the strategy space of the
attacker is V , the strategy space of the defender is C ⊆ 2V ,
and the payoffs are given by (1) and (2), parameterized by
• p ∈ [0, 1] : probability that the agent is an attacker;
• cd ∈ R+ : cost of detection;
• cfa ∈ R+ : cost of false alarm;
• PN : V → [0, 1] : probability measure that describes the
non-attacker’s distribution on V;
• R : V → R+ : the reward function.
Throughout the paper, we analyze this game as a simulta-
neous, complete information game. In particular we assume
that the payoffs’ parameters are common knowledge. We are
also able to formulate our game in normal (matrix) form since
5the non-attacker is not strategic. At time 0, the attacker selects
the attack vector and the defender selects the classifier. The
uncertainty is coming from the presence or not of a strategic
player. The expected utility of the defender incorporates this
uncertainty through the probability p. The game would differ
significantly if we supposed that there were two or more
different types of strategic attackers. In such a setting we
would not be able to reduce our model to a matrix game.
A. Model discussion and limitations
Before analyzing the game defined above, let us note that,
as every model, it makes simplifying assumptions that limit
its applicability and there are interesting aspects of security
problems that it does not capture. Nevertheless, through its
simplicity, we believe our model provides useful insights about
the structure of Nash equilibria and the driving factors and
intuition behind the players’ equilibrium strategies that can be
useful in some application scenarios. These insights would be
difficult to obtain through a more complex, mathematically
less tractable model. Moreover, the analysis of our simple
model yields original and non-trivial mathematical results and
derivations that can be useful to study more complex models.
We leave this as future work but we clarify here the main
limitations of our present model, the scenarios in which our
assumptions may hold (or not) and some of the ways in which
our results could be useful as a basis for further studies.
One of the main assumptions in our model is that the
attacker is granted the reward R(v) even in case of detection,
and that the detection cost is the same for the attacker and
for the defender. This assumption is technically important as
we will see because it gives the “almost zero-sum” nature of
the game that supports our analysis; but it limits the potential
applicability of our model. For the reader to get a better idea
of the implication of this assumption, we provide here three
example scenarios, two where the assumption is reasonable
and one where it is not.
Consider first the task of classifying an incoming email
as spam or not. If the email is marked as spam, then the
user never sees it so the attacker is granted the reward only
upon no detection. Such a scenario cannot be captured by our
model, but there are other examples in which the assumption
make sense, such as the following two. Consider the problem
of classifying fake news. There is an immediate reward to
the publisher who spreads out the fake news (popularity, re-
shares, advertising money). If the publisher gets classified as
spreading out fake news, then the publisher loses credibility
and/or ability to post more news. The detection cost can
be seen as the lost opportunity cost from future posts of
news (fake or real) which is also the detection bonus for the
defender. Finally, consider the problem of classifying malware
in apps. Most apps nowadays monetize ads shown to users
but malicious apps can trick users to click on ads or gain
important personal information of the user who has installed
the app. When a malicious app is detected, some harm has
already been done that cannot be reversed. The detection cost
for the attacker would be the lost opportunity cost from being
banned to show future ads. This cost can be seen as the
detection bonus for the defender because in the place of this
bad actor, another legitimate app can show ads with some
expected lifetime reward. (Essentially, the impressions that
would be allocated to this app can be diverted to be shown to
other similar apps.)
Our model also assumes that parameter cd is a constant
independent of v, i.e., the defender gets a constant bonus inde-
pendent of the attack for detecting the attack. This assumption
is instrumental in obtaining the results that the defender only
mixes amongst threshold strategies on the attacker’s reward.
Again, this assumption is reasonable in many cases but not in
others. For the fake news or malware apps scenarios above, it
is reasonable to assume that this cost is independent from the
actual attack intensity, since it can be seen as lost opportunity
cost from monetizing ads in the future. For cases such as
audits from IRS though, there are usually fines imposed to
tax fraudsters which makes the cost symmetric (whatever the
fraudster pays, the IRS wins), but the fine usually depends
on the amount misreported. Building on our results for the
simpler case, however, we believe that it would be possible to
study the game where cd depends on v. One would need to
find a ranking of attack vectors (depending on both functions
R and cd) such that an equivalent of our Lemma 4 holds.
Finally, our model is specified as a strategic-form game in
which players choose their actions once, without knowing how
their opponent has played. While this is a simplification of
reality, the framework does not prevent us from considering
players that take into account the future ramifications of the
immediate outcome. For instance, attackers may perceive an
opportunity cost of being less able to profit from future attacks
by being detected now. As in models of economic competition
and market entry, players can incorporate these opportunity
costs into their payoff functions that describe their preferences
over the outcomes of the “one-shot” game at hand [54]. That
said, there are phenomena in repeated strategic interactions
that are exposed only when the repeated interaction is modeled
explicitly, such as in repeated games in which cooperative
outcomes are enforced by the threat of future punishment [22].
If one were to develop and analyze an adversarial classification
game that explicitly models the dynamics of an attacker and
defender interacting on multiple occasions over an extended
period, that model would need the analysis of the one-shot
game to construct the needed value functions (see e.g., [21]).
Thus our present results, in particular through the exponential
reduction of the strategy space of the defender (Theorem 1)
can be seen as a stepping-stone for constructing such a
dynamic game model.
III. JUSTIFICATION OF THRESHOLD STRATEGIES
In this section, we show that in equilibrium, the defender’s
strategy space can be reduced to threshold classifiers on the
attacker reward. The sufficiency of threshold classifiers is a
useful result as it allows us to compute the Nash equilibria
of the game analytically and efficiently while simultaneously
providing intuition about the players’ equilibrium strategies.
In particular, the number of classifiers can be as large as 2|V|
while the number of threshold classifiers is of size |V|+ 1, so
6this is a great reduction in the defender’s strategy space. We
first introduce a number of useful definitions for the analysis of
our game. Then in Section III-A, we show that the defender’s
strategy space can be reduced to the set of threshold classifiers
and in Section III-B, we show that the attacker’s strategy space
can also be reduced.
We will be interested in mixed strategy equilibria, in which
the attacker randomizes across multiple attack vectors with a
probability distribution α on V and the defender randomizes
across multiple classifiers with a distribution β on C. The
expected attacker and defender payoffs are then given by
UA(α,β) =
∑
v∈V
∑
c∈C
αvU
A(v, c)βc, (3)
UD(α,β) =
∑
v∈V
∑
c∈C
αvU
D(v, c)βc. (4)
Note that a pure strategy is a special case of mixed strategies in
which that particular pure strategy is selected with probability
1 and every other strategy with probability 0.1
Recall the definition of Nash equilibrium [22]:
Definition 3 (Nash equilibrium). The pair of probability
measures (α,β) on V and C respectively is a Nash equilibrium
(NE) of game G if each player’s mixed strategy is a best
response to the other player’s mixed strategy, i.e.,
UA(α,β) ≥ UA(αˆ,β), (5)
for every probability distribution αˆ over V , and
UD(α,β) ≥ UD(α, βˆ) (6)
for every probability distribution βˆ over C.
We define the notion of best-response equivalent games in
the same way as in [42]:
Definition 4. Two games are best-response equivalent if the
sets of best response strategies of a player in both games
coincide for any strategy of the other player.
Note that for best-response equivalent games, the strategy
spaces of each player in both games need to be the same.
We now define the reduced strategy space for the defender
that consists of threshold rules on all possible attack rewards.
Definition 5 (Set of threshold classifiers).
CT = {c ∈ C : c(v) = 1R(v)≥t,∀v ∈ V for some t ∈ R}.
When using a threshold classifier, the defender compares
what the attack reward would have been from the observed
attack vector to a threshold instead of computing a mapping
from any possible attack vector to a detection probability. We
assume that CT ⊆ C, which holds for any reasonable C, in
particular for C = 2V . The outcome of the analysis of the
paper is that in most cases the defender should not use a single
optimal value of t. Instead, the threshold should be chosen
randomly from a particular range of values with a particular
1For most instances of interest no pure-strategy equilibrium exists. If one
player chooses deterministically a pure strategy, the opponent would switch
to a strategy to either evade detection completely or to guarantee detecting
the attacker.
distribution. This range and distribution are found using the
analysis of this paper.
We also define the probability of detection function as the
probability of class 1 classification (or detection) given the
attack vector v and the defender’s strategy β.
Definition 6 (Probability of detection function). The probabil-
ity of detection for an attack vector v and defender’s strategy
β is defined as
piβd (v) =
∑
c∈C
βc1c(v)=1, ∀v ∈ V. (7)
A. Defender’s reduced strategy space
Threshold strategies are simple and intuitive, but their
optimality is not guaranteed a priori. Yet, in the classification
game, we show that threshold strategies are optimal in a sense
formalized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For any NE (α,β) of G =
(V, C, p, cd, cfa, PN, R(·)), there exists a NE of
GT = (V, CT , p, cd, cfa, PN, R(·)) with the same α and
equilibrium payoff pair and the same pid in the support of the
non-attacker’s distribution.
Theorem 1 shows in particular that, when restricted to
using only threshold classifiers, the defender achieves the same
equilibrium payoff. Hence, although there may exist Nash
equilibria where the defender uses other classifiers, he does
not lose anything by using only threshold classifiers.
At a high level, the intuition behind Theorem 1 is as follows.
First, we can show that the utilities depend on the defender’s
strategy β only through the probability of detection function
piβd . Then, we show that, at any NE, pi
β
d is non-decreasing
in the attacker’s reward (i.e., higher rewarding vectors have a
higher probability of being detected). Finally, we show that
any probability of detection function that is non-decreasing in
the attacker’s reward can be achieved by a mix of threshold
classifiers. The proof of Theorem 1 is provided at the end of
this section. We first establish a series of lemmas that give
information about the game structure and will be used in the
proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. For any strategy profile (α,β) of G =
(V, C, p, cd, cfa, PN, R(·)), the expected payoffs of the players
depend on β only through the probability of detection function
piβd (·):
UA(α,β)=
∑
v∈V
(
αvR(v)− cdαvpiβd (v)
)
, (8)
UD(α,β)=−UA(α,β)− 1− p
p
cfa
∑
v′∈V
(
PN(v
′)piβd (v
′)
)
. (9)
By abuse of notation, we denote the probability of detection
function by pid, instead of pi
β
d , when it brings no ambiguity.
Lemma 2. For any function f :V→[0, 1], there exists a prob-
ability measure β over C = 2|V| s.t. piβd (v) = f(v),∀v ∈ V .
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Fig. 1. Three cases for strategies selected in NE (see Lemma 3).
Proof. Let f be an arbitrary function from V to [0, 1]. Without
loss of generality, we reindex strategies v such that f is non-
decreasing, i.e., ∀vi, vj ∈ V , with i < j, f(vi) ≤ f(vj).
Starting with the attack vector v1 with the lowest value of f ,
we assign probability βc1 = f(v1) to the classifier c1 ∈ C with
c1(v) = 1,∀v ∈ V . We then assign βc2 = f(v2) − f(v1) to
the classifier c2 with c2(v) = 1,∀v ∈ V \ {v1}. We continue
this process until we reach the last vector v|V|. We assign
probability f(v|V|)− f(v|V|−1) to the classifier that classifies
only v|V| as coming from an attacker. The remaining weight
1 − f(v|V|) (if positive) is given to the classifier that never
classifies the agent as an attacker. The strategy β derived with
the above procedure is guaranteed by construction to have
elements in [0, 1] with unit sum. Moreover piβd (v1) = βc1 =
f(v1) since v1 is classified as coming from an attacker only
by c1, pi
β
d (v2) = βc1 + βc2 = f(v2) since v2 is classified as
coming from an attacker only by c1 and c2, and so on until
piβd (v|V|) =
∑|V|
i=1 βci = f(v|V|) since v|V| is classified as
coming from an attacker by all classifiers c1 through cv|V| .
Thus we have constructed a valid probability measure β over
C, with piβd (v) = f(v),∀v ∈ V .
Without loss of generality, we now order the attack vectors
in increasing attacker reward, i.e., R(vi) ≤ R(vi+1), ∀i ∈
{1, . . . , |V| − 1}. The following lemma, illustrated in Fig. 1,
establishes results on the players supports.
Lemma 3. If (α,β) is a NE of G = (V, C, p, cd, cfa, PN, R(·))
that yields a probability of detection function pid, then ∀v ∈ V
such that PN(v) > 0, one of the following three cases hold.
• Case 0: αv = 0 and pid(v) = 0,
• Case 1: αv > 0 and pid(v) = 0,
• Case 2: αv > 0 and pid(v) > 0.
Furthermore R(v0) ≤ R(v1) < R(v2), for any strategies
v0, v1, v2 in Cases 0, 1, and 2 respectively.
Proof. Suppose that (α,β) is a NE and that there exists
v∗ ∈ V with PN (v∗) > 0 such that αv∗ = 0 and piβd (v∗) > 0.
Let βˆ be a mixed strategy of the defender assigning zero
detection probability on v∗ and leaving the probability of
detection unchanged for other attack vectors, i.e., such that
piβˆd (v
∗) = 0 and piβˆd (v) = pi
β
d (v), for all v 6= v∗. By Lemma 2,
strategy βˆ exists. By Lemma 1, we have
UD(α, βˆ) = UD(α,β)+
1− p
p
cfaPN(v
∗)piβd (v
∗) > UD(α,β),
which contradicts the fact that (α,β) is a NE.
We now show that R(v0) ≤ R(v1) < R(v2),∀v0, v1, v2 in
Cases 0, 1, and 2 respectively. Since both pure strategies v1, v2
are included in the attacker’s equilibrium mixed strategy,
UA(v1,β) = U
A(v2,β). Since pid(v1) = 0 and pid(v2) > 0,
R(v1)− cd · 0 = R(v2)− cdpid(v2)⇒ R(v1) < R(v2).
Moreover, since αv0 = 0, αv1 > 0, U
A(v0,β) ≤ UA(v1,β).
Since pid(v0) = pid(v1) = 0, this implies R(v0) − cd · 0 ≤
R(v1)− cd · 0, hence R(v0) ≤ R(v1).
Lemma 3 shows that, under some assumptions about the
non-attacker’s distribution, in NE: (1) the defender is never
classifying as attacker upon seeing an attack vector that the
attacker never uses, and (2) the attacker randomizes only
amongst the most rewarding attack vectors and the defender
randomizes only amongst classifiers that classify as attacker
upon seeing the most rewarding attack vectors. This is illus-
trated in Section V, using numerical experiments.
We can also show the following corollary.
Corollary 1. If (α,β) is a NE of G =
(V, C, p, cd, cfa, PN, R(·)), for all vi, vj in Case 1,
R(vi) = R(vj).
Proof. Let v1, v2 be in Case 1. Then αv1 > 0, αv2 > 0 and
pid(v1) = pid(v2) = 0. (10)
Since the attacker mixes among both pure strategies v1, v2,
these give the same expected utility to the attacker, we have:
UA(v1,β) = U
A(v2,β)
⇒ R(v1)− cd · 0 = R(v2)− cd · 0, (using (10))
hence R(v1) = R(v2).
What we show next is that, under certain assumptions on
the non-attacker’s behavior, vectors of higher attacker reward
have higher or equal probability of getting detected.
Lemma 4. Let v1, v2 ∈ V be such that PN (v1), PN (v2) >
0. In any NE (α,β) of G = (V, C, p, cd, cfa, PN, R(·)) that
yields a probability of detection function pid, we have R(v1) ≤
R(v2)⇒ pid(v1) ≤ pid(v2).
Hence, if PN(v) > 0,∀v ∈ V , pid(v) is non-decreasing in
the attack reward R(v).
Proof. Let v1, v2 ∈ V be such that PN (v1), PN (v2) > 0 and
R(v1) ≤ R(v2). By Lemma 3, v1, v2 are in Case 0, 1, or 2. If
both v1, v2 are in either Case 0 or 1, then pid(v1) = pid(v2) = 0
so that pid(v1) ≤ pid(v2) holds. Similarly the result holds if
v1, v2 are in Cases 0 or 1 and 2 respectively, since pid(v1) = 0
and pid(v2) > 0.
The only remaining case is when both v1 and v2 are in Case
2. By Lemma 3, we have αv1 > 0, αv2 > 0. Since the attacker
mixes among both v1, v2, then UA(v1,β) = UA(v2,β). But,
from (8) we have
UA(v2,β)=U
A(v1,β)+R(v2)−R(v1)+cd (pid(v1)−pid(v2)) ,
so that R(v2) ≥ R(v1) implies pid(v1) ≤ pid(v2).
Recall that Lemma 2 (and its proof) give a way to construct,
for any probability of detection function targeted, a defender’s
strategy β that does yield this probability of detection function.
The first step in the proof of Lemma 2 was to reindex attack
8vectors so that they have non-decreasing detection probability.
By Lemma 4, vectors ranked in non-decreasing reward already
satisfy this property (if PN(v) > 0,∀v ∈ V). We can thus skip
the step of reindexing and describe the nature of classifiers c ∈
C that are given positive weight. Classifier c1 detects all attack
vectors and is equivalent to a threshold classifier with threshold
equal to the reward of the vector with the smallest reward (or
smallest detection probability). Classifier c2 detects all vectors
except the one with the smallest reward and is equivalent to a
threshold classifier with threshold equal to the second smallest
attack reward, and so on until we reach classifier c|V| that
detects only the attack vector with highest reward (threshold
equal to the highest reward). The remaining weight (if any)
is given to classifier c|V|+1 that always classifies the agent as
a non-attacker, which is a threshold classifier with threshold
larger than the highest reward R(v|V|). The above procedure
leads to the following corollary of Lemma 2:
Corollary 2. For any NE (α,β) of G =
(V, C, p, cd, cfa, PN, R(·)) that results in a non-decreasing
probability of detection piβd there exists a NE (α, βˆ) of G,
where βˆc = 0,∀c ∈ C − CT and piβd (v) = piβˆd (v), ∀v ∈ V .
We now give the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 1). Let (α,β) be a NE of G =
(V, C, p, cd, cfa, PN, R(·)), that results in a probability of de-
tection function piβd .
Step 1. First assume that PN(v) > 0, for all v ∈ V . By
Lemma 4, piβd is non-decreasing hence we can directly apply
Corollary 2, which gives a probability βˆ over C with positive
weight only on CT such that (α, βˆ) is a NE of G. Therefore
(α,βT ) is also NE of GT = (V, CT , p, cd, cfa, PN, R(·)), where
βT is a probability measure over CT with βTc = βˆc, for all
c ∈ CT and piβTd (v) = piβˆd (v) = piβd (v), for all v ∈ V .
Step 2. Second, assume that there exists a unique v∗ ∈ V
with PN(v∗) = 0. Note that, if αv∗ > 0, then pid(v∗) = 1.
Indeed, suppose pid(v∗) < 1. Consider βˆ that results in
piβˆd (v
∗) = 1 and piβˆd (v) = pi
β
d (v), for all v 6= v∗. By Lemma 2,
such βˆ exists. By Lemma 1,
UD(α, βˆ) = UD(α,β) + cd
(
1− piβd (v∗)
)
> UD(α,β),
which contradicts the fact that (α,β) is a NE. We distinguish
two sub-cases:
(a) v∗ is not the highest reward vector, i.e., there exists vˆ ∈
V , with R(vˆ) > R(v∗). In that case, αv∗ = 0. Indeed,
suppose that αv∗ > 0. By the previous analysis, pid(v∗) =
1. By Lemma 1 we have
UA(vˆ,β) = UA(v∗,β) +R(vˆ)−R(v∗) + cd · (1− pid(vˆ)),
> UA(v∗,β),
since R(vˆ) > R(v∗) and pid(vˆ) ≤ 1. Contradiction.
Let β˜ be such that piβ˜d (v
∗) = piβd (v
∗
next) (where v
∗
next is the
next rewarding strategy after v∗) and piβ˜d (v) = pi
β
d (v), for
all v 6= v∗. By Lemma 2, such β˜ exists. Since αv∗ = 0,
(α, β˜) is still a NE of G, with the same pair of payoffs
as (α,β), but with probability of detection function piβ˜d
non-decreasing in the attack reward. We can then apply
Corollary 2 and conclude in the same way as in Step 1;
and piβ
T
d (v) and pi
β
d (v) will differ only for v = v
∗.
(b) v∗ is the highest reward vector, i.e., for all v ∈ V, R(v∗) >
R(v). In that case, either αv∗ > 0 and then pid(v∗) = 1
so that pid is non-decreasing in the attack reward and we
conclude as in Step 1; or αv∗ = 0 and then we define β˜
such that piβ˜d (v
∗) = 1 and piβ˜d (v) = pi
β
d (v) for all v 6= v∗
and conclude as in Step 2(a).
Step 3. Finally, the procedure above generalizes straightfor-
wardly if there exist several attack vectors with PN (v) = 0,
hence concluding the proof.
B. Reduced attacker’s strategy space and equilibrium struc-
ture
We now turn to the attacker’s equilibrium strategy. We first
show Lemma 5, which gives the attacker’s equilibrium strategy
for most attack vectors. Then we show that this result, together
with the reduction of the defender’s strategy space, allow us
to reduce the attacker’s strategy space as well.
Lemma 5. If (α,β) is a NE of G = (V, C, p, cd, cfa, PN, R(·)),
then for all v ∈ V such that 0 < pid(v) < 1,
αv =
1− p
p
cfa
cd
PN(v). (11)
Proof. Consider vi ∈ V with pid(vi) ∈ (0, 1). Since pid(vi) 6=
0, there exists ci ∈ C s.t. ci(vi) = 1 with βci > 0. Since
pid(vi) 6= 1, there exists c∗ ∈ C s.t. c∗(vi) = 0 with βc∗ >
0. Now suppose that ci(v) = c∗(v),∀v ∈ V − {vi}. This
is without loss of generality. Indeed, even if we cannot find
in the support of β two such classifiers, we can construct
another defender’s strategy β˜ that contains two such classifiers
and has the same probability of detection function. We do
that using a construction similar to the one in the proof of
Lemma 2. If other vectors have the same reward as vi, we
include separately each classifier that detects those vectors as
attacks. Since β and β˜ have the same probability of detection
function, (α, β˜) is also a NE.
Finally, since βci > 0, βc∗ > 0, U
D(α, ci) = U
D(α, c∗),
that is∑
v∈V
αv
(
R(v)−cd1ci(v)=1
)
+
1−p
p
cfa
∑
v′∈V
PN(v
′)1ci(v′)=1
=
∑
v∈V
αv
(
R(v)−cd1c∗(v)=1
)
+
1−p
p
cfa
∑
v′∈V
PN(v
′)1c∗(v′)=1.
This yields
−cdαvi +
1− p
p
cfaPN(vi) = 0,
which immediately gives the result.
Lemma 5 shows that for attack vectors v with some un-
certainty of getting detected, the attacker mixes proportionally
to the non-attacker’s distribution. Note that the result clearly
also applies to any Nash equilibrium of GT . Yet, the attacker’s
strategy space could be large and complex. For instance,
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consider a game in which there are M different targets and
the attacker chooses at each time step from 1 to N a target to
attack in {0, . . . ,M} (counting the no-attack case). An attack
v is a sequence of N attacks and V is the set of all such
sequences which is of cardinality (M + 1)N . If the defender’s
classification rule is a threshold on the attack reward, however,
permutations of attacks that yield the same attack reward will
have the same probability of getting detected. Hence, as we
explain below, they can be collapsed into a single strategy. For
instance, if only the total number of times each target is hit
(and not the order of the attacks) matters for the reward of
the attacker, there are only
(
N+M+1
N
)
combinations of attack
rewards, and then at most that many unique values of the
attacker’s reward. Hence, we can exploit the fact that the
defender uses only threshold classifiers in GT and reduce the
cardinality (and complexity) of the attacker’s strategy space.
As N or M increase, the benefits from this reduction become
more profound.
The intuition behind the reduction in the attacker’s strategy
space comes from the following observation: If the attacker
includes in his equilibrium support one attack vector of a
certain reward, he should include all vectors of the same
reward since all of them will have the same probability of
detection. By Lemma 5, the attacker’s equilibrium weight on
each one is proportional to the non-attacker’s distribution.
Since the defender’s classification is based on the reward of
the attack vectors (and not on the actual vector), a game
in which the attacker mixes on attack rewards (instead of
attack vectors) does not influence the defender’s equilibrium
strategy. Furthermore, such a game does not give any more
or less freedom to the attacker, but reduces the complexity
(cardinality) of the strategy space of the attacker.
We now formalize the reduction of the game GT to a game
GR,T . The new attacker’s strategy space is defined as the set
of all images of the reward function R : V → R+ (see an
illustration in Fig. 2):
Definition 7 (Reduced strategy space of the attacker).
VR = {r ∈ R+ : r = R(v), for some v ∈ V}. (12)
Note that, although VR is not rigorously a subset of V ,
VR is a reduced strategy space in the sense that R is clearly
a surjection from V to VR. The non-attacker’s probability
measure can be similarly reduced to a probability measure
that describes the non-attacker’s distribution on VR with
PRN (r) =
∑
v′
PN(v
′ ∈ V)1R(v′)=r. (13)
Finally, since in GT , β is a probability on CT , we have
that c(v) is the same for all v with the same reward and that
any two attack vectors with the same reward have the same
probability of detection. Hence, by abuse of notation, we can
define c(r) as c(v) for any v such that R(v) = r, and we can
define the probability of detection function as a function of
the reward by pid(r) := pid(v), where r = R(v). The reduced
game GR,T = (VR, CT , p, cd, cfa, PRN ) is then defined as the
game between the attacker choosing r ∈ VR and the defender
choosing c ∈ CT where the utilities adapt (1)-(2) in the obvious
way:
UA(r, c) = r − cd1c(r)=1,
UD(r, c) = −UA(r, c)− 1− p
p
cfa
∑
r′∈VR
PRN (r
′)1c(r′)=1.
The expected utilities in mixed strategies also adapt (8)-(9) in
the obvious way.
The following proposition formalizes the relationship be-
tween the NE of GT and GR,T .
Proposition 1. If (α,β) is a NE of GT =
(V, CT , p, cd, cfa, PN, R(·)), then (α∗,β) is a NE of
GR,T = (VR, CT , p, cd, cfa, PRN ) with the same equilibrium
payoff pair where α∗ri =
∑
vj∈V,R(vj)=ri
αvj , ∀ri ∈ VR.
The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in the Appendix.
The importance of Proposition 1 comes from the fact that it is
easier to compute the NE (α∗,β) of GR,T , in which the cost
matrix of the attacker consists of non-identical rows. This NE
is given in Theorem 2 in Section IV. However, from the NE
(α∗,β) of GR,T , we can easily recover a NE (α,β) of GT as
follows. By Proposition 1, β is unchanged. Given α∗ on VR
we compute the attacker’s strategy α over V , as follows: For
ri ∈ VR with pid(ri) ∈ (0, 1), αvi is given by (11) ∀vi ∈ V
with R(vi) = ri, by Lemma 5. For ri with pid(ri) ∈ {0, 1},
any possible combination of weights is possible, as long as∑
vj∈V,R(vj)=ri αvj = α
∗
ri . Hence, although we reduce the
attacker’s strategy space, we provide a roadmap to get all
NE of GT as well. Note that if all attack strategies in V
yield distinct attack reward, then |V| = |VR| and there is no
reduction in the attacker’s strategy space.
IV. NASH EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
Our goal in this section is to characterize the structure of
the NE of the classification game. It is known that every finite
game (finite number of players with finite number of strategies
for each player) has a mixed-strategy NE [37]. Our game is
finite, thus it admits a NE in mixed strategies. However, finding
the Nash equilibrium has a high computational complexity in
the general case [15].
We consider the game GR,T = (VR, CT , p, cd, cfa, PRN ), in
which the attacker’s strategy space consists of distinct attack
rewards r ∈ VR, the defender’s strategy space consists of
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threshold classifiers c ∈ CT , and PRN is the non-attacker’s
probability measure on VR given by (13). We denote by ri,
i ∈ {1, . . . , |VR|} the elements of VR and, without loss of
generality, we assume that they are ranked in increasing order,
i.e., ri < ri+1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , |VR|−1}. Similarly, classifier
ci corresponds to a threshold classifier with threshold equal to
the attacker reward ri. Recall (see Definition 5) that a threshold
classifier with threshold t classifies as attacker if the reward
is r ≥ t. Hence, c1 corresponds to the “always classify as
attacker” strategy. By definition, CT also includes the “always
classify as non-attacker” strategy, which is denoted by c|VR|+1
and corresponds to a threshold r|VR|+δ for any δ > 0. Hence
we have |CT | = |VR|+ 1.
We can express the payoff functions of the players in
compact form as matrices. We define Λ˜ to be the cost matrix of
the attacker, with Λ˜(i, j) = cd1ri≥rj − ri, i ∈ {1, . . . , |VR|},
j ∈ {1, . . . , |VR + 1|}:
Λ˜ = cd

1 0 · · · · · · 0 0
... 1
. . .
...
...
...
. . . . . .
...
...
...
. . . 0
...
1 · · · · · · . . . 1 0

−

r1
r2
r3
...
r|VR|−1
r|VR|

·1′|VR|+1.
Recall that we use the prime sign (′) for transpose of matrices
and vectors. There are |VR| rows (strategies) for the attacker,
ranked by increasing reward. Certain computations are simpli-
fied by using a matrix with only positive entries. Therefore,
we define Λ , Λ˜ + (r|VR| + ) · 1|VR|×|VR|+1, where  > 0.
Adding a constant to the players’ payoff does not affect their
best responses, and hence does not change the equilibrium
strategies. Thus, from here on, we will use matrix Λ to define
the players’ payoffs.
In the following, the pair (α,β) will denote the probability
measures of the attacker and defender on VR, CT respectively.
The attacker’s expected cost is given by α′Λβ. The defender’s
expected payoff is given by α′Λeqβ, with
Λeq = Λ− 1|VR| · µ′, (14)
where µ represents the false alarm penalty vector for the
defender with elements µi =
1− p
p
cfa
∑
k≥i
PRN (rk). We as-
sume that µ is a strictly decreasing vector (component-wise):
µi > µi+1,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , |VR|}. This assumption is equivalent
to assuming that the non-attacker gives some positive weight
to all strategies r ∈ VR, i.e., PRN (ri) > 0,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , |VR|}.
Even if this property does not hold, we can still describe how
both players behave, as shown in Theorem 1 in Section III.
It is easy to show that GR,T = (VR, CT , p, cd, cfa, PRN )
is best-response equivalent (see Definition 4) to a zero-sum
game, in which the attacker’s cost is given by α′Λeqβ.
Indeed, the two games have the same players with the same
strategy spaces. Vector µ depends only on the non-attacker’s
distribution and is fixed. Adding constants to the columns of
the cost matrix of the attacker (row player) in the original
classification game yields the cost matrix of the attacker of the
new game without changing the Nash equilibria of the game.
Indeed, the defender’s payoff matrix is unchanged, and, for
any given β, minimizing α′Λβ and minimizing α′Λeqβ with
Λeq(i, j) = Λ(i, j)−µj give the same minimizing strategy for
the attacker. Thus the two games generate the same sets of best
response functions and have the same equilibrium strategies.
Note that the best-response equivalence of our game to
a zero-sum game guarantees that in all NE the defender’s
expected payoff will be the same (and equal to the value of
the zero-sum game), but the attacker’s payoff is not always the
same in each equilibrium of the original nonzero-sum game.
Indeed, equilibria of our original game could give different
payoffs to the attacker after transforming his cost matrix Λeq
(adding constants to the columns) back to Λ.
There exist polynomial algorithms to compute the Nash
equilibria in zero-sum games via a transformation to a linear
program (LP) [26]. These algorithms, however, do not provide
structure on the equilibrium strategies. In the remaining of
this section, we aim to give more intuition on the players’ NE
strategies than the solution derived via a linear programming
toolbox. Along the way, we also provide an algorithm to
compute the NE, which can be faster than solving the LP.
Our results can be summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 finds all NE of the classification
game GR,T . Moreover, if (α,β) is a NE, then, there exists
k ∈ {1, . . . , |VR|} such that
β = (0, . . . , 0, βk, . . . , β|VR|, β|VR|+1),
α = (0, . . . , 0, αk, . . . , α|VR|),
where
βi =
ri − ri−1
cd
, ∀i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , |VR|}, (15)
αi =
1− p
p
cfa
cd
PRN (ri), ∀i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , |VR| − 1}, (16)
and βk, β|VR|+1 ≥ 0 and αk, α|VR| ≥ 0 are such that
(i) βk ∈ (0, rk−rk−1cd ), β|VR|+1 = 0, and
αk satisfies (16), α|VR| > 0; or
(ii) βk = 0, β|VR|+1 > 0, and
αk ∈ (0, 1−pp cfacd PRN (rk)), α|VR| satisfies (16); or
(iii) βk = 0, β|VR|+1 = 0, and
αk∈[0,min( 1−pp cfacd PRN (rk), 1−
∑|VR|−1
i=k+1 αi)], α|VR|≥0; or
(iv) βk ∈ [0, rk−rk−1cd ], β|VR|+1 ≥ 0, and
αk, α|VR| satisfy (16).
The rest of this section is dedicated to proving Theorem 2.
As a direct consequence of best-response equivalence of our
game to a zero-sum game, we have the following result.
Lemma 6. In NE, the defender’s strategy β solves the
following linear program (LP):
maximize
β,z
− µ′β + z
subject to z1|VR| ≤ Λβ
1′|VR|+1 · β = 1, β ≥ 0.
(17)
Proof. If (α,β) is a NE of GR,T with attacker’s cost ma-
trix Λ, then (α,β) is a NE of the zero-sum, best-response
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equivalent game with cost matrix Λeq. Therefore, β maximizes
minαα
′Λeqβ = min[Λβ]−µ′β. Transforming this optimiza-
tion problem to an LP we get the program (17).
An important consequence of Lemma 6, is that the de-
fender’s strategy β in Nash equilibrium maximizes her mini-
mum payoff. Thus playing β gives the defender the robustness
property that her expected payoff will not be any worse than
her expected Nash equilibrium payoff regardless of what the
attacker chooses to play.
We now define the main entities used throughout the section.
Definition 8. A polyhedron is the solution set of a finite num-
ber of linear inequality constraints. An inequality constraint
is tight if it holds as an equality; otherwise, it is loose. A
point x = (x1, . . . , x|VR|+1) of a polyhedron is said to be
extreme if there is no x′ whose set of tight constraints is a
strict superset of the set of tight constraints of x. For an n-
dimensional linear program, a point is called a basic solution,
if n linearly independent constraints are tight for that point. A
feasible solution to a linear program is a solution that satisfies
all constraints. A point is a basic feasible solution, iff it is a
basic solution that is also feasible. Two distinct basic feasible
solutions to an n-dimensional linear program are adjacent
if we can find n − 1 linear independent constraints that are
tight at both of them. We say that a point x of a polyhedron
corresponds to strategy β (or strategy β corresponds to x),
if β = x/‖x‖.
Extreme point and basic feasible solution are equivalent
terms [32, Chapter 2.5] and we will use them interchangeably.
A. Form of optimal extreme points
In this section, we gain intuition on the structure of the
defender’s NE strategy β. We first show the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Any NE strategy β of the defender corresponds to
an extreme point or a convex combination of extreme points
of the polyhedron defined by
P : Λx ≥ 1|VR|,x|VR|+1 ≥ 0. (18)
The proof of Lemma 7 can be found in the Appendix. We
call the first type of constraints “inequality constraints” and the
second type “positivity constraints.” There are |VR| inequality
constraints and |VR|+ 1 positivity constraints. Writing down
the inequality constraints, we get
cd · x1 +
(
r|VR| − r1 + 
) · ‖x‖ ≥ 1
cd · (x1 + x2) +
(
r|VR| − r2 + 
) · ‖x‖ ≥ 1
...
cd · (x1 + x2 + . . .+ x|VR|) +  · ‖x‖ ≥ 1.
Searching for an extreme point of the polyhedron P defined
in (18) is computationally straightforward and there are known
algorithms that provide polynomial complexity. Our goal is to
provide an algorithm that can run faster (though still polyno-
mially) and in parallel to provide intuition on the structure of
the extreme points. The main method used is to reduce the
search space by eliminating suboptimal non-extreme points.
Combining properties of basic feasible solutions of an LP
and of the structure of the defender’s LP, we show the follow-
ing lemma describing the set of tight inequality constraints.
Lemma 8. At an extreme point x that corresponds to a
defender’s NE strategy β, there exists exactly one contiguous
block (of indices) of inequality constraints that are tight and
the last inequality constraint is tight.
The proof of Lemma 8 can be found in the Appendix. We
define s as the index of the first (starting) tight inequality
constraints. The lemma states that all inequality constraints
from s to |VR| are tight. We can now state the result that
describes the form of optimal extreme points of the defender’s
LP. Its proof is in the Appendix.
Lemma 9. Any extreme point x of polyhedron P that corre-
sponds to a defender’s NE strategies is of one of the following
types:
Type I: x=
(
0, . . . , 0, xs1≥0, xs1+1>0, . . . , x|VR|>0, 0
)′
,
Type II: x=
(
0, . . . , 0, xs2+1>0, . . . , x|VR|>0, x|VR|+1≥0
)′
,
for some s1, s2 ∈ {1, . . . , |VR|}, with xi = ri − ri−1
cd
‖x‖ for
all i ∈ {sj + 1, . . . , |VR|} (j ∈ {1, 2}). Moreover, there exist
at most one extreme point of type I and two adjacent extreme
points of type II that correspond to a defender’s NE strategies.
B. Form of players’ equilibrium strategy
With Lemma 9 that describes the form of the possible
extreme points of polyhedron P defining the constraints of the
defender’s LP, we can now prove our main result, Theorem 2.
The complete proof can be found in the Appendix. It essen-
tially works by enumerating all of the possible combinations
of optimal basic feasible solutions allowed by Lemma 9 to
get the possible forms of β (i.e., all possible solutions of the
defender’s LP which we consider the primal) and using the
complementary slackness condition from Linear Programming
to get the possible forms of α (i.e., all possible solutions of
the dual LP).
Theorem 2 provides both an algorithm (Algorithm 1) that
finds all NE and a compact characterization of the restricted
number of possible forms that a NE can have. Interestingly, we
observe that the defender assigns a weight to a reward ri that
is positive and proportional to the marginal reward increase
at that point, on a support that goes until the highest reward
r|VR|. This is somewhat counter-intuitive as it implies that
the defender includes at NE with positive weights classifiers
that almost never classify as attacker even for a high reward
and even if the probability that a non-attacker uses this
reward is arbitrarily small. We also recover in Theorem 2 the
fact that the attackers mimics the non-attacker’s distribution
(proportionally) on a support that corresponds to the defender’s
support.
For readers familiar with Linear Programming, let us finally
remark that the result in Theorem 2 (and its proof) is in accor-
dance with the relationship between degeneracy and multiplic-
ity of the primal and the dual optimal solutions [47, p. 144]
12
(a degenerate optimal solution is a solution of size n where
more than n constraints are tight). If there exists a unique
non-degenerate optimal solution of the primal (defender’s LP)
then the optimal solution to the dual problem (the attacker’s
LP) is also unique and non-degenerate (cases (i) and (ii) of
Theorem 2). If the primal has multiple solutions with at least
one non-degenerate then the optimal solution to the dual is
unique and degenerate (case (iv) of Theorem 2). If the primal
optimal solution is unique and degenerate, then the dual has
multiple optimal solutions (case (iv) of Theorem 2). Another
benefit of having the solution of the game corresponding to
the solution of an LP is that there are well studied methods
for analyzing the sensitivity of an LP to parameters (see for
instance [10]). These methods can be used to study how
sensitive the game solution is to parameter perturbations.
Algorithm 1: How to compute the NE (α,β)
1 for type = 1, 2 do
2 construct β for s ∈ {1, . . . , |VR|} using Algorithm 2
3 find (β1,2, s
∗
1,2) that maximize defender’s payoff U
D
1,2
4 if UD1 > UD2 then
5 β ← compute-β(s∗1, 1); α← compute-α(s∗1)
6 if UD1 < UD2 then
7 if s∗2 is unique then
8 β ← compute-β(s∗2, 2); α← compute-α(s∗2)
9 else
10 // denote s∗2a and s
∗
2b=s
∗
2a+1 the 2
solutions
11 βa←compute-β(s∗2a, 2);
βb←compute-β(s∗2b, 2)
12 β ← convex hull of βa,βb
13 α← compute-α(s∗2b)
14 if UD1 = UD2 then
15 if s∗2 is unique then
16 // s∗2 = s
∗
1
17 β1 ← compute-β(s∗1, 1);
β2 ← compute-β(s∗1, 2)
18 if β1 6= β2 then
19 β ← convex hull of β1,β2
20 else
21 β ← β1
22 α← compute-α(s∗1)
23 else
24 // denote s∗2a and s
∗
2b=s
∗
2a+1 the 2
solutions
25 // the type 1 and type 2a solutions
are identical
26 βa←compute-β(s∗2a, 1);
βb←compute-β(s∗2b, 2)
27 β ← convex hull of βa,βb
28 α← compute-α(s∗2b)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically study several instances of
our model and observe the behavior of the players in NE. In
Algorithm 2: Compute-β(s, type)
1 for i = 1 to s− 1 do
2 βi ← 0
3 for i = s+ 1 to |VR| do
4 βi ← ri − ri−1
cd
5 remainder ← 1type=1(1−
∑|VR|
s+1 βi)
6 if type=1 then
7 βs ← remainder, β|VR|+1 ← 0
8 if type=2 then
9 βs ← 0, β|VR|+1 ← remainder
10 // UD(β) is the defender’s NE payoff
UDtype ← min[Λβ]− µ′β
Algorithm 3: Compute-α(β, k)
1 // β is the set of all convex
combinations if multiple
2 for i = 1 to k − 1 do
3 αi ← 0
4 for i = k + 1 to |VR| − 1 do
5 αi ← 1− p
p
cfa
cd
PRN (ri)
6 if βk > 0 for some β then
7 αk ← 1− p
p
cfa
cd
PRN (rk)
8 α|VR| ← 1−
∑|VR|−1
i=k αi
9 else if β|VR|+1 > 0 for some β then
10 α|VR| ←
1− p
p
cda
cd
PRN (r|VR|)
11 αk ← 1−
∑|VR|
i=k+1 αi;
12 else if βk = β|VR|+1 = 0 then
13 for i = 1 to k − 1 and i = k + 1 to |VR| − 1 do
14 α1i ← αi, α2i ← αi
15 α1k ← 0
16 α2k ← min
(
1−p
p
cfa
cd
PRN (rk), 1−
∑|VR|−1
i=k+1 αi
)
17 α1,2|VR| ← 1−
∑|VR|−1
i=k α
1,2
i
18 α ← convex hull of α1,α2
particular, we explore the strategic attacker’s exploitation of
the knowledge he has of the non-attacker’s distribution (noise).
A. Single-feature-based classification
We first consider GR,T = (VR, CT , p, cd, cfa, PN), in which
classification is based on a single feature, i.e., there is a single
target of interest and the defender observes how often this
target is (or attempted to be) compromised. The attacker’s
strategy space consists of N + 1 attack rewards r0, . . . , rN ,
with ri = i · ca representing the attack reward when the target
is compromised i times. The defender’s strategy space CT
consists of all threshold classifiers on ri. The attacker bears
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a cost of cd upon detection. The false alarm penalty for the
defender when she mistakenly classifies the non-attacker as an
attacker is expressed by the factor cfa.
The non-attacker, typically a normal user (or noise from the
point of view of defender looking to do attacker detection),
accesses the target i times with binomial distribution: attack
reward ri is the outcome of i successes over N trials with
probability of success θ0. His behavior results in a distribution
PRN =
(
N
k
)
θk0 (1− θ0)N−k. (19)
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Fig. 3. Equilibrium distributions.
Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium mixing distributions of
the players, and the probability distribution of non-attackers,
for the following particular choice of parameters: ca = 1,
cd = 120, p = 0.2, cfa = 140, VR = {r0, . . . ri, . . . , r100},
with ri = ica, and PRN (ri) given by (19) with θ0 = 0.2.
This example turns out to illustrate all of the major structural
findings of the players’ equilibrium distributions proved in
Theorem 2. In particular:
i) The attacker uses a truncated, scaled version of the
distribution of the non-attacker, but only on a subset
of the support (the interior of the defender’s support).
Moreover, his strategy space comprises of actions that
yield the highest payoffs.
ii) The defender uses a set of contiguous strategies (thresh-
olds on the attack reward) that consist of the most
rewarding attack vectors. This is in contrast with known
algorithms such as logistic regression which have a
predefined shape of the boundary independently of the
attacker’s goal.
iii) The weight assigned to each threshold is proportional to
the marginal reward increase at that point. If the marginal
reward increase is constant, the defender randomizes
uniformly among strategies in the interior of her support.
Note that this equilibrium is calculated easily by using the
results from Section IV, without any need for a complex
program. For the defender, the weight given to each strategy is
constant in the interior of the support, equal to βi =
ri−ri−1
cd
=
ca
cd
= 1120 .
In the following, we see how changes in the parameters
affect the players’ equilibrium payoffs. First we study how the
equilibrium payoffs change as ca, the cost to the defender of a
single attack (or conversely reward to the attacker), increases
and cd, the cost to attacker of a detection event, is fixed. For
instance, consider the real world problem of online click fraud
which is prominent in pay-per-click (PPC) online advertising.
Owners of websites that post the ads are paid an amount of
money determined by how many visitors to the sites click
on the ads. Malicious owners of sites could choose to use
low-priced key words to attract less attention from the fraud
classifiers of the ad-network, or be more aggressive and pick
high-priced keywords. If the expected reward is very high,
the attacker might as well attack with full strength (e.g.,
choose high-priced keywords) to get the revenue generated
by the ads, and risk immediate detection. As we see in Fig. 4,
when ca rises, the attacker’s strategy becomes more and more
concentrated on attacking the target with more frequency, since
the expected cost of being detected becomes relatively less
important. In fact, in the extreme case where ca is much larger
than cd, the attacker always attacks the maximum number
of times even though he is always detected in the process.
Increasing ca relative to cd gives the attacker more power to
earn reward at the defender’s cost, without giving the defender
any corresponding increase in the ability to “fight back.” Thus
one should expect that as ca rises the equilibrium payoff to
the attacker should rise and that of the defender should fall.
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Fig. 4. Attacker’s support lower bound (top) and equilibrium payoffs of
attacker and defender (bottom) as ca, the cost of a single attack, is varied.
In Figure 5 we observe the impact of the false alarm penalty
parameter. In real world scenarios, the false alarm penalty
incurred to the defender can differ a lot. For example, credit
card companies care more about classifying a real user as
fraudster than a mail provider who classifies an email as spam
or not spam. As the false alarm penalty increases, the defender
reduces false alarms by concentrating her distribution of
threshold choice on higher values. Conversely, the attacker can
exploit the higher thresholds by using attack distributions more
concentrated on attack strategies that yield higher reward. Thus
raising cfa increases attacker payoff and decreases defender
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payoff in equilibrium.
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Fig. 5. Attacker’s support lower bound (top) and equilibrium payoffs of
attacker and defender (bottom) as cfa, the cost of false alarm, is varied.
Observe that in Fig. 5 the attacker’s expected payoff has
a staircase nature. This is an effect of the discrete optimal
values of the starting index s of the contiguous block of
tight inequality constraints: for some region of parameters,
the same s is optimal. For the same optimal s, the support
of the defender’s strategy stays the same and the detection
benefit, hence the attacker’s equilibrium payoff is the same.
The defender’s staircase nature is slightly affected by the false
alarm penalty factor in her payoff function. The above result
suggests that in practice, the attacker is not so sensitive to false
alarm penalty variations. Thus, even a few different buckets
of estimated false alarm penalty costs to the defender would
be sufficient for the attacker to compute his optimal strategy.
Even if the underlying parameter cost fluctuates by a small
amount, the attacker’s strategy might remain the same.
B. Multiple Features: optimal investment defender strategies
In the previous experiments, classification was based on
a single feature. In a security environment, one important
decision of the defender (or network administrator) is to decide
whether incorporating an additional feature would improve
attacker classification, and improve it enough to justify any
additional cost in collecting that data.
The feature vector of the defender, upon which the classifi-
cation is based, may consist of multiple features. For example,
the feature vector of Twitter’s classification algorithms (which
differentiate fraudulent accounts from legitimate ones), might
consist of features such as the number of followers, average
number of retweets per tweet, number of mentions, country
of origin, and others. Before the defender decides to collect
more features for her classification purposes, she should be
aware that the most successful feature is the one that remains
stealthy from the attacker. If she invests a lot into acquiring
features that can be easily learned by the attacker, then the
window of expected high reward (see Scenario 2 in Fig. 6)
might be too small to compensate for the increased expenses
of the feature acquisition and maintenance.
In this experiment we suppose that the defender observes
which servers in her network a user accesses, and one of these
servers is known to all parties to be particularly valuable.
The observation of how many times this “valuable server”
is accessed we designate as feature 1. A possible second
feature the defender can use in classification is inspired by the
literature of detecting portscanners [25]. Jung et al. found from
empirical data a distinction between benign and malicious
portscanners in terms of the proportions of the connections
that were successfully established. In particular they define
a metric, called inactive-pct, as the ratio of the number of
hosts to which failed connections are made versus the number
of hosts to which successful connections are made. Jung et
al. found that benign users (e.g., web search engines) have a
low inactive-pct (< 80%), as a larger fraction of connections
will be successfully established. On the contrary, malicious
portscanners often have a high inactive-pct presumably be-
cause they initiate a lot of connections to detect vulnerabilities
and terminate them immediately.
In our experiment, the attacker decides how many times to
access the “valuable server” over a window of N = 2 time
slots. Moreover, the attacker explores the other ports of the
network, in parallel, looking for other targets of opportunity.
He can access these other ports with a low or high inactive-
pct. Scanning with a low inactive-pct is less efficient at
finding targets, so it is less rewarding for the attacker. In this
experiment, the attacker chooses to attack the “valuable server”
either 0, 1, or 2 times, and also chooses whether to have a low
or high inactive-pct. Thus there are 3× 2 = 6 attack vectors.
The reward for each is set to be ca = 1 times the number
of attacks of the “valuable server” plus clow = 2 if inactive-
pct is chosen low and chigh = 4.1 if inactive-pct is chosen
high. We also suppose that p = 0.2 (the prior probability a
user is an attacker), θ0 = 0.3 (the non-attacker’s frequency
of access to the “valuable server”), and θlow = 0.8 (the non-
attacker’s probability to have a low inactive-pct), cd = 1 (the
cost of detection), and cfa = 1 (the cost of false alarm). The
experiment consists of four scenarios:
1. The defender only observes feature 1, the number of
times an agent accesses the “valuable server,” and the
attacker knows only feature 1 is being used in the classifier.
Consequently, the attacker only uses the high inactive-pct
strategy vectors since choosing a low inactive-pct only
reduces reward without changing detection probability.
2. The attacker continues to play the equilibrium strategy of
scenario 1 while the defender now has access to feature 2,
inactive-pct, and uses this to optimize her classifier. The
defender assumes, correctly for now, that the attacker keeps
the same strategy as in scenario 1. The attacker continues
to use the equilibrium strategy of scenario 1 because he
does not “know” that the defender has access to feature 2.
3. The defender continues to use the equilibrium strategy of
scenario 2, but now the attacker knows that the defender
changed classifiers to use both features and optimized it
against a scenario 1 attacker.
4. Both features are used by the defender, and it is common
knowledge of both players that both features are being used.
As we see in Fig. 6, when the attacker does not know that
the defender classifies him based on two features (scenario 2),
15
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
D
ef
en
de
r’s
 e
qu
ilib
riu
m
 p
ay
of
f
Fig. 6. Scenario 1: Defender does not differentiate between low and high
“inactive-pct”. Scenario 2: Attacker mistakenly believes he is only classified
based on a single feature. Scenario 3: Defender mistakenly believes that
attacker believes he is classified based on a single feature. Scenario 4: Both
players know that two sensors (features) determine classification.
the defender’s payoff increases from scenario 1 in which the
defender only classified the agent based on a single feature.
When the attacker finds out that he is getting classified on
multiple features, then the defender’s value decreases from
scenario 2, since the attacker is smart enough to realize why
he got detected. Comparing scenarios 1 and 4, we see that in
this experiment the defender’s NE payoff increases when she
has access to two features, but the benefit is greatly diminished
by the attacker’s counter response to the new classifier.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we propose and analyze a new game-theoretic
model of adversarial classification. Contrarily to most previous
research, our model takes into account the key differences
between the objectives of the attacker and defender using a
nonzero-sum game, yet it is simple enough to yield analytical
results that bring intuitive insights into the structure of the
Nash equilibrium and how classification should be performed
against this type of adversary. In particular we show that, to
remain stealthy while maximizing reward, the attacker mixes
amongst attack vectors with a distribution proportional to the
non-attacker’s distribution (i.e., to normal behavior) but on a
reduced support of attack vectors with highest rewards. The
defender, on the other hand, mixes between classifiers that
correspond to applying a threshold on the attacker’s reward.
This result intuitively shows that, in a strategic setting, the
classifier should combine features according to the attacker’s
reward function (i.e., by looking at the reward a given fea-
ture/attack vector gives). Hence, using a standard classifier
with a fixed shape of the decision boundary (such as logistic
regression with a linear boundary) will necessarily be subopti-
mal regardless of how the parameters of the model are trained
if the reward function does not have the predefined shape.
Our results on the defender’s equilibrium strategy also show
the need for randomization (mixed strategy) and show that the
weight assigned to each threshold is mainly proportional to the
marginal reward increase at that point.
An important element in the tractability of our model is
the special structure of the payoffs that makes our game best-
response equivalent to a zero-sum game and hence allows us to
use Linear Programming tools to search for all Nash equilibria.
Surprisingly, although this equivalence seems straightforward,
the literature in security games is largely looking at zero-sum
games. We believe that models that better capture realistic
scenarios in which the defender and attacker have different
tradeoffs in their objective functions but are still computation-
ally equivalent to zero-sum games could be studied using an
approach similar to ours.
A major assumption of most game theoretic models is that
players are rational – simply meaning that each player has
preferences over the possible outcomes of the game that can
be represented by assigning each outcome a payoff which each
player tries to maximize in expectation. In many games such
as ours, the solution concept that is most natural is that of a
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. However there are always
questions of whether players will actually play these mixed
strategies, and indeed this has been an area that the luminaries
of game theory have given considerable thought over the years
(see Rubinstein [44] for a review). As Rubinstein points out,
while there are cases in which mixed strategies may be seen
as an abstraction of interacting with a population of players,
or decision making with private information, there are cases in
which players have an incentive to randomize. It is the case in
our game as both attacker and defender have an incentive to be
unpredictable. Another domain in which agents are motivated
to be unpredictable is sport, where empirical studies have
shown players to randomize according to Nash equilibrium
distributions [41]. The players likely are not calculating the
Nash equilibrium analytically but instead are learning about
the frequencies in which opponents play certain actions.
Finally, even if one doubts whether the attacker will behave
“rationally,” the defender has a compelling reason to consider
following the mixed strategy prescribed by this work. The
reason is that the defender’s equilibrium mixed strategy min-
imizes the maximum cost the defender can suffer from the
attacker, however the attacker chooses to play. This includes
the possibility of an attacker that attacks in some non-strategic
way, such as according to an automated script that is not finely
tuned to be the optimal attack for a particular defender. On the
other hand, a defender might wish to exploit the predictability
of some non-strategic attackers by employing a multi-stage
approach to first find the attackers who follow a consistent
pattern before applying the approach described in this paper.
Overall, our paper makes a step towards building better
attack detection systems using classification techniques that
take into account the objective of the attacker to optimize the
defense. Our results show that game theory is a valuable tool
to tackle adversarial classification problems in settings that are
not worst-case as it provides a formal way to justify the need
for randomization and to optimize the defense distribution for
a given attacker’s objective. In future work, we plan to extend
our results to more complex adversarial settings.
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APPENDIX
Proof (Lemma 1). For the attacker, from (3) we derive
UA(α,β) =
∑
v∈V
∑
c∈C
αvU
A(v, c)βc
=
∑
v∈V
∑
c∈C
αv
(
R(v)− cd1c(v)=1
)
βc
=
∑
v∈V
αv
(
R(v)− cd
∑
c∈C
βc1c(v)=1
)
=
∑
v∈V
(
αvR(v)− cdαvpiβd (v)
)
,
where piβd (v) is given by (7). Similarly, for the defender, (4)
yields
UD(α,β) =
∑
v∈V
∑
c∈C
αvU
D(v, c)βc
= −
∑
v∈V
∑
c∈C
αvU
A(v, c)βc
−
∑
c∈C
βc
∑
v′∈V
1− p
p
cfaPN(v
′)1c(v′)=1
= −UA(α,β)−
∑
v′∈V
1− p
p
cfaPN(v
′)piβd (v
′).
Proof (Proposition 1). Let (α,β) be a NE of GT .
First note that if all attack vectors yield distinct rewards
(|V| = |VR|), the result holds trivially (and α∗ = α).
Now assume that there exist v1, v2 ∈ V with v1 6=
v2 and R(v1) = R(v2) and all other vectors yield a distinct
reward. Define r1 = R(v1) = R(v2) and ri = R(vi) for
all i ∈ {3, · · · , |V|}; and α∗ as in Proposition 1, that is
α∗r1 = αv1 +αv2 and α
∗
ri = αvi ,∀i ∈ {3, · · · , |V|}. Since β is
a probability distribution on CT , the probability of detection
is the same for any two attack vectors with the same reward,
in particular pid(v1) = pid(v2). By slight abuse, we denote
pid(r1) = pid(v1) = pid(v2) and pid(ri) = pid(vi),∀i ∈
{3, · · · , |V|}. Then, with obvious notation, we have
UA(α,β) =
|V|∑
i=3
(αviR(vi)− cdαvipid(vi))
+
2∑
i=1
(αviR(vi)− cdαvipid(vi))
=
|V|∑
i=3
(α∗riri − cdα∗ripid(ri))
+ α∗r1r1 − cdα∗r1pid(r1)
=UA(α∗,β)
and similarly for the defender; and (α∗,β) is a NE of GR,T .
Finally, this reasoning extends straightforwardly to the case
for there can be more than two vectors yielding the same
reward, hence concluding the proof.
Proof (Lemma 7). By the fundamental theorem of linear
programming, if there exists an optimal solution to an LP,
it will occur at an extreme point or a convex combination of
extreme points of the polyhedron defined by the constraints.
The defender’s LP admits an optimal solution, otherwise
Nash’s theorem of NE existence would be violated.
Let [β, z] be an extreme point of the polyhedron defined
by the constraints of (17). We define x , β/z. Note that
z = min[Λβ] > 0, since Λ is positive, hence x is finite.
Substituting for x, the constraints in (17) become Λx ≥ 1|VR|,
x ≥ 0. Scaling the objective and the inequality constraints
of (17) with a positive scalar results in an equivalent problem
which has the same maximizers [9, Chapter 4.1.3]. Thus x is
an extreme point of the polyhedron defined by Λx ≥ 1|VR|,
x ≥ 0. This concludes the proof of Lemma 7.
Proof (Lemma 8). Let x be an extreme point of the polyhedron
P defined by (18) that corresponds to defender equilibrium
strategy β with β = x/‖x‖. Such a point is of dimension
|VR|+ 1, thus |VR|+ 1 constraints are tight at x. First note
that at least one inequality constraint is tight at x. Indeed,
otherwise we would have all |VR| + 1 positivity constraints
tight which is impossible since 0|VR|+1 /∈ P . We next show
that, if an inequality constraint is tight, then the next one is
tight as well. By recursion, that concludes the proof.
Suppose that, at x, inequality constraint l ∈ {1, |VR| − 1}
is tight and inequality constraint l + 1 is loose. Subtracting
the tight inequality constraint l from the loose inequality
constraint l + 1 yields xl+1 >
rl+1 − rl
cd
‖x‖ > 0. Hence
we can define the transformed vector xˆ by:
xˆi =

xi for i ∈ {1,· · ·, l}∪{l+3, · · ·, |VR|+1},
rl+1 − rl
cd
‖x‖ for i = l + 1,
xl+2 + xl+1 − rl+1 − rl
cd
‖x‖ for i = l + 2.
With this definition, we have ‖xˆ‖ = ‖x‖ and, since both x and
xˆ belong to P and have (at least) a tight inequality constraint,
min[Λx] = min[Λxˆ] = 1. Hence, defining βˆ = xˆ/‖xˆ‖,
we have min[Λβˆ] = min[Λβ]. Finally, since µ is strictly
decreasing by assumption, we have µ′(β− βˆ) = µl+1(βl+1−
βˆl+1) + µl+2(βl+2 − βˆl+2) > 0. We conclude that
min[Λβˆ]− µ′βˆ > min[Λβ]− µ′β,
which contradicts the fact that β is a NE strategy.
Proof (Lemma 9). Let x be an extreme point of polyhedron P
that corresponds to a defender NE strategy β. By Lemma 8,
inequality constraints s through |VR| are tight at x.
We first show that xi = 0,∀i ∈ {1, · · · , s − 1}. Suppose
that there exists i ∈ {1, · · · , s − 1} s.t. xi > 0. From x, we
define a new point xˆ by the following transformation. Start
with xˆ = x, then reduce xˆi and increase xˆi+1 by the same
amount until either xˆi = 0 or the inequality constraint i is
tight. If xi+1 > 0, then the tight constraints at x remain tight
at xˆ but xˆ has one more tight constraint (either positivity or
inequality) which contradicts the fact that x is an extreme
point. If xi+1 = 0, then x and xˆ have the same number of
tight constraints, but defining βˆ = xˆ/‖xˆ‖ we have min[Λβˆ] =
min[Λβ] and µ′β > µ′βˆ, which contradicts the fact that β
is a NE strategy.
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Next, we note that for any i ∈ {s + 1, · · · , |VR|}, sub-
tracting tight inequality i − 1 from tight inequality i yields
xi =
ri − ri−1
cd
‖x‖ > 0.
We finally show that xs and x|VR|+1 cannot be both positive.
Suppose that xs > 0 and x|VR|+1 > 0. Then, we define xˆ from
x by the following transformation:
xˆi =

γxi ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , s− 1} ∪ {s+ 1, . . . , |VR|}
0 for i = s
γ(xs + xi) for i = |VR|+ 1,
(20)
with γ =
1
1− cdxs =
1
‖x‖[r|VR| − rs + ]
> 1. The definition
of γ is such that the sth inequality constraint is still tight
after the transformation: γ
(
cd0 + [r|VR| − rs + ]‖x‖
)
= 1.
The loose inequality constraints before s become looser at xˆ
and the previously tight inequality constraints s + 1 through
|VR| remain tight at xˆ; but there is one extra tight positivity
constraint at xˆ (xˆs = 0), which contradicts the fact that x is
an extreme point.
Combining the above three arguments, we conclude that x
has a form given by one of the two types in the lemma.
We now show that there is at most one extreme point x of
Type I that corresponds to a NE strategy β. Suppose there exist
two extreme points x1a,x1b of Type I that both correspond to
NE defender strategies β1a,β1b. Then,
min[Λβ1a]− µ′β1a = min[Λβ1b]− µ′β1b.
Without loss of generality, suppose that s1b > s1a. The
inequality constraint with index |VR| is tight at both extreme
points, therefore ‖x1‖ = ‖x2‖ = 1
cd + 
which yields that
min[Λβ1a] = min[Λβ1b] = cd + . Then we have
min[Λβ1b]− µ′β1b = min[Λβ1a]− µ′β1b
> min[Λβ1a]− µ′β1a,
where the last inequality is a result of the strictly decreasing
false alarm penalty vector µ; which is a contradiction.
Finally, we show that there exist at most two adjacent
optimal extreme points of Type II. Suppose that there exist
three optimal extreme points x1,x2,x3 of Type II that corre-
spond to defender NE strategies β1,β2,β3 respectively. Then
these are adjacent [8]. Without loss of generality, suppose
that s2, s2 + 1, s2 + 2 are the starting indices of the block of
inequality constraints that are tight at x1,x2,x3 respectively.
Since all three extreme points are optimal, we have
min[Λβ1]−µ′β1 =min[Λβ2]−µ′β2 =min[Λβ3]−µ′β3. (21)
The first inequality constraint that is tight for each extreme
point yields:
min[Λβi] = r|VR| − rs2+i−1 + , for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
Subtracting consecutive tight inequalities yield
βij =
rj − rj−1
cd
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, s2 + i− 1 ≤ j ≤ |VR|,
and since all three extreme points are of Type II, we have
βij = 0, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, 0 ≤ j ≤ s2 + i− 1;
With this, the first and second equality in (21) bring
cd =µs2+1 − µ|VR|+1,
cd =µs2+2 − µ|VR|+1,
respectively. This implies µs2+1 = µs2+2, which contradicts
the assumption that µ is a strictly decreasing vector. The proof
extends straightforwardly to rule out cases with more than
three optimal extreme points.
Proof (Theorem 2). Since game GR,T is best-response equiv-
alent to the zero-sum game with payoff matrix Λeq for the
defender, finding all Nash equilibria of GR,T is equivalent
to finding all solutions β of the defender’s LP (17) and all
solutions α of the attacker’s LP which is the dual of (17):
maximize
α,y
y
subject to α′Λ + y1|VR|+1 ≤ µ′
1′|VR| ·α ≥ 1, α ≥ 0.
(22)
To find all the solutions of (17), we will use Lemma 9
(recall that β = x/‖x‖). From the defender’s solution β,
we will be able to give all the attacker’s solutions α using
the complementary slackness condition of linear programming
[38, Chapter 6.2.1] and Lemma 5. Before enumerating the
possible solutions, let us observe that the j-th inequality
constraint of the dual (22) can be written as
cd
|VR|∑
i=j
αi −
|VR|∑
i=1
riαi + r|VR| + + y ≤ µj .
If two consecutive inequality constraints j and j + 1 of the
dual are tight, subtracting the second from the first gives
αj =
µj−µj+1
cd
= 1−pp
cfa
cd
PRN (rj). By complementary slackness,
this will happen with βj > 0 and βj+1 > 0, which implies
pid(ri) ∈ (0, 1). Hence we recover the result of Lemma 5 using
complementary slackness.
From Lemma 9, there can be at most three optimal basic
feasible solutions of (17), one of type I and two adjacent of
type II. We call UD1 (resp. U
D
2 ) the largest defender’s utility for
a basic feasible solution of type I (resp. type II). Each optimal
basic feasible solution can be degenerate or non-degenerate: a
type I solution is degenerate is βs1 = 0 and a type II solution
is degenerate if β|VR|+1 = 0. To prove Theorem 2, we simply
go exhaustively through all possible cases.
Case 1: there exists a unique optimal basic feasible solution of
type I (UD1 > U
D
2 ) with index s1 = s
∗
1. Then, we have βs∗1 6= 0
and βs∗1 6= k (otherwise the solution would also be of type II),
βs∗1 ≤ rk−rk−1cd (otherwise the k-th inequality constraint of the
primal is violated), and β|VR|+1 = 0. Hence β is of the form
of Theorem 2-(i) with k = s∗1.
Since this solution is unique and non-degenerate, the dual
also has a unique and non-degenerate solution. By comple-
mentary slackness, we have αi = 0,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , s∗1 − 1} and
by Lemma 5, αi satisfies (16) for all i ∈ {s∗1, · · · , |VR| − 1}
since pid(ri) ∈ (0, 1). Finally, α|VR| > 0, otherwise the
solution would be degenerate. Hence α is also of the form
of Theorem 2-(i) with k = s∗1.
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Case 2: there exists a unique optimal basic feasible solution of
type II (UD2 > U
D
1 ) with index s2 = s
∗
2. Then, we have βs∗2 =
0 and β|VR|+1 > 0. Hence β is of the form of Theorem 2-(ii)
with k = s∗2.
Since this solution is unique and non-degenerate, the dual
also has a unique and non-degenerate solution. By comple-
mentary slackness, we have αi = 0,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , s∗2 − 1}
and by Lemma 5 or complementary slackness, αi satisfies
(16) for all i ∈ {s∗2 + 1, · · · , |VR|}. Finally, αs∗2 6= 0
and αs∗2 6= 1−pp
cfa
cd
PRN (rs∗2 ) (otherwise the solution would be
degenerate) and αs∗2 ≤ 1−pp
cfa
cd
PRN (rs∗2 ) (otherwise the s
∗
2-th
inequality constraint of the dual would be violated). Hence α
is also of the form of Theorem 2-(ii) with k = s∗2.
Case 3: there exists a unique degenerate optimal basic feasible
solution which is both of type I and II (UD2 = U
D
1 ) with index
s1 = s2 = s
∗. Then, we have βs∗ = 0 and β|VR|+1 = 0.
Hence β is of the form of Theorem 2-(iii) with k = s∗.
Since this solution is unique and degenerate, the dual
has multiple solutions. By complementary slackness, we have
αi = 0,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , s∗ − 1} and by Lemma 5 or com-
plementary slackness, αi satisfies (16) for all i ∈ {s∗ +
1, · · · , |VR| − 1}. We also have αs∗ ≤ 1−pp cfacd PRN (rs∗)
(otherwise the s∗-th inequality constraint of the dual would
be violated). Hence, the only two possible basic feasible
solutions for the dual are the one with αk = 0 and the
one with αk = min( 1−pp
cfa
cd
PRN (rk), 1 −
∑|VR|−1
i=k+1 αi), and
with α|VR| = 1 −
∑|VR|−1
i=k αi in each case (note that if
1−p
p
cfa
cd
PRN (rk) = 1 −
∑|VR|−1
i=k+1 αi, then the second solution
has α|VR| = 0 and is degenerate but this is no contradiction).
Any linear combination of these two basic feasible solutions
is optimal. Hence α is also of the form of Theorem 2-(iii)
with k = s∗.
Case 4: there exist two non-degenerate optimal basic feasible
solutions of type II (UD2 > U
D
1 ) with indices s2 = s
∗
2a and
s2 = s
∗
2b = s
∗
2a+1. Then, any linear combination of these two
solutions is an optimal solution and has βs∗2a = 0, βs∗2a+1 ∈
[0,
rs∗2a+1−rs∗2a
cd
] and β|VR|+1 > 0 (both basic feasible solutions
have β|VR|+1 > 0 since they are non-degenerate). Hence β is
of the form of Theorem 2-(iv) with k = s∗2a + 1.
Since there are multiple non-degenerate solutions for the
primal, there is a unique degenerate solution for the dual. By
complementary slackness, we have αi = 0,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , s∗2a}
and by Lemma 5 or complementary slackness, αi satisfies (16)
for all i ∈ {s∗2a + 1, · · · , |VR|}. Hence α is also of the form
of Theorem 2-(iv) with k = s∗2a + 1.
Case 5: there exist one non-degenerate optimal basic feasible
solution of type I and one non-degenerate optimal basic
feasible solution of type II (UD2 = U
D
1 ) with indices s1 = s
∗
1
and s2 = s∗2. These two solutions must be adjacent, hence
s∗1 = s
∗
2. For arguments similar to case 1, the type I solution
has βs∗1 ∈ (0, rk−rk−1cd ) and β|VR|+1 = 0 whereas for
arguments similar to case 2, the type II solution has βs∗1 = 0
and β|VR|+1 > 0. Any linear combination of these two basic
feasible solutions is an optimal solution. Hence β is of the
form of Theorem 2-(iv) with k = s∗1.
Since there are multiple non-degenerate solutions for the
primal, there is a unique degenerate solution for the dual. By
complementary slackness, we have αi = 0,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , s∗1 −
1} and by Lemma 5 or complementary slackness, αi satisfies
(16) for all i ∈ {s∗1, · · · , |VR|}. Hence α is also of the form
of Theorem 2-(iv) with k = s∗1.
Case 6: there exist one degenerate optimal basic feasible so-
lution of type I and type II with indices s1 = s∗1 = s2 = s
∗
2a
and one non-degenerate optimal basic feasible solution of type
II (UD2 = U
D
1 ) with index s2 = s
∗
2b = s
∗
2a + 1. The first
solution has βs∗2a = 0 and β|VR|+1 = 0. The second solution
has βs∗2a+1 = 0 and β|VR|+1 > 0. Any linear combination
of these two basic feasible solutions is an optimal solution.
Hence β is of the form of Theorem 2-(iv) with k = s∗2a + 1.
Since there are multiple solutions for the primal, any
solution for the dual is degenerate and since at least one of
the primal’s solution is non-degenerate, the dual’s solution
must be unique (otherwise, the dual’s dual which is the primal
would have all its solutions degenerate). By complementary
slackness and Lemma 5 applied to both of the primal’s
optimal basic feasible solutions, the dual solution must have
αi = 0,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , s∗2a} and αi satisfies (16) for all
i ∈ {s∗2a + 1, · · · , |VR| − 1}. Hence α is also of the form
of Theorem 2-(iv) with k = s∗2a + 1.
Case 7: there exist one non-degenerate optimal basic feasible
solution of type I and two non-degenerate optimal basic
feasible solutions of type II (UD2 = U
D
1 ) with indices s1 = s
∗
1,
s2 = s
∗
2a = s
∗
1 and s2 = s
∗
2a + 1.
This case cannot happen. Indeed, there would be a unique
non-degenerate solution for the dual. By complementary slack-
ness or Lemma 5 applied to the type I solution, we would have
that αs∗2a satisfies (16) hence αs∗2a > 0 and by complementary
slackness applied to the second type II solution, we would
have α = 0, which is impossible.
